Date | League | Transaction |
---|---|---|
2009 NBA Draft | NBA | Drafted 17th overall by Philadelphia. |
20th July, 2009 | NBA | Signed four year, $7,558,492 rookie scale contract with Philadelphia. Included team options for 2011/12 and 2012/13. |
21st October, 2010 | NBA | Philadelphia exercised 2011/12 team option. |
30th June, 2011 | NBA | Philadelphia exercised 2012/13 team option. |
31st October, 2012 | NBA | Signed a four year, $41,000,004 extension with Philadelphia. |
10th July, 2013 | NBA | Traded by Philadelphia, along with the draft rights to Pierre Jackson (#42, 2013), in exchange for the draft rights to Nerlens Noel (#6, 2013) and a 2014 first round pick (#10, Elfrid Payton). |
6th July, 2017 | NBA | Re-signed by New Orleans to a five year, $131.1 million contract. Included player option for 2021/22. |
2008 - 2009 | UCLA (NCAA) |
June 2009 - July 2013 | Philadelphia 76ers (NBA) |
July 2013 - present | New Orleans Pelicans (NBA) |
June 29, 2017
Jrue Holiday
PG/SG, 6’4, 205lbs, 27 years old, 8 years of experience
One of the few holdovers from the previous version of the Pelicans, Holiday started slow due to his personal matter yet ended up having a plenty solid Jrue Holiday-type season. When he played, he was his usual excellent defensive self, no matter the matchup, alongside some decent half court point guard play and a few points of his own. The chemistry and fit is not yet there with Davis and Cousins, but talent wins out, and time is the only real requirement. Some teams that are short of a point guard may wish to overpay Holiday in free agency, and the cost of retaining him could prove to be a very expensive one on a team already with two huge financial commitments to make and without the revenues of their peers. But no teams bidding on him can ever need him more than the Pelicans already do.
Player Plan: Entering free agency on an expiring $11,286,518 contract. With Paul off the table, Holiday may find bidders, although with Hill and Lowry also on the market, he might still be third on some lists. Either way, re-upping him is very important and inevitably very expensive. Nine figures expensive. So be it.
November 6, 2013
[...] The lure of first-round picks is in what they can yield, not what they always do. It is well established, of course, that many first-round picks are failures relative to expectation, and this is truer the lower they are. However, first-rounders can yield star talent, star talent that has no choice but to sign with you. It can yield quality role players for basement prices, and it can yield contributors in any form you choose. Most importantly, however, first-rounders are always young and cheap. Bad teams need this to get good, and good teams need this to stay good when the market forces and punitive luxury taxes designed to break them up necessitate they cut costs. Talent is talent, but cheap, young talent is the best type of talent.
Back at the start of the summer, Utah took on a whopping $25 million in salary that it didn't want in the forms of Andris Biedrins, Richard Jefferson and Brandon Rush, purely to acquire two first-round picks and three second-round picks from the Golden State Warriors. The Jazz did this because it was more beneficial to their long-term rebuilding goal to target first-round picks, and that amount of money is now the cost of acquiring them. Or at least, it should be. First-round picks should be a valued commodity, much more than they were. Now, it seems as though they finally are.
A cursory look at the market indicates this change in philosophy. The last few deals to have included first-round picks include:
- Washington trading a pick (top-12 protected in 2014, top-10 protected through 2019, thereafter unprotected) along with Emeka Okafor in exchange for Marcin Gortat.
- Indiana trading a pick (lottery protected through 2019, thereafter unprotected) along with Miles Plumlee and Gerald Green in exchange for Luis Scola
- Boston acquiring first-rounders in all of 2014, 2016 and 2018 as a part of the Paul Pierce and Kevin Garnett deal
- New Orleans acquiring Jrue Holiday and Pierre Jackson in exchange for the rights to Nerlens Noel and a 2014 first-round pick
- Toronto acquiring a 2016 first-round pick from New York -- along with two second-round picks, Steve Novak and Marcus Camby -- in exchange for Andrea Bargnani
In that list, we mostly see first-rounders traded for quality. Hall of Fame players like Pierce and Garnett, fringe All-Stars like Holiday or non-lottery picks for a legitimate starting center in Gortat. The ones where we don't see that -- the deals for Scola and Bargnani -- therefore stand out as bad deals for that reason. The inclusion of the first-round picks in each instance leaves the recipient team drastically overpaying for backup-caliber forwards. And if he's not re-signed or extended, the Gortat deal might join them.
July 12, 2010
Dante Cunningham
Considering he's always been a power forward in a small forward's body, Cunningham made a pretty decent effort of pretending otherwise. Given plenty of opportunities due to injury, Cunningham shot his customary mid range two's well, rebounding well enough for a man of his size, and proved he could play defense on most small and power forwards. He also turned it over only 25 times all year, leading all rookies in turnover percentage at 6.0%. This is helped significantly by the fact that he doesn't dribble, but nevertheless, it's a hugely impressive number. (Tyler Hansbrough was next lowest at 7.1% in his part-season of work; Marcus Thornton was third at 7.3%. The worst? Jrue Holiday, 21.9%. Then James Johnson. Then Hasheem Thabeet.)
July 6, 2010
Jrue Holiday
Holiday's rookie season was a mixed bag. He shot 39% from three point range, shoring up one of his weaknesses early, but he also turned it over 2.1 times a game in 24 minutes. He also posted very bad defensive statistics, yet this is attributable in no small part to the fact that from the very first day of his career, he drew all the toughest defensive assignments, a task to which he took admirably. Of course, it also won't have helped him that Philly really didn't run an offense worth a damn, had no set rotation or balance in ther lineup, relied on Andre Iguodala as the primary halfcourt creator (which he just isn't that good at), and had a coach devoted to a playbook entirely ill-suited to his personnel. And considering Holiday turned 20 only three weeks ago, we can overlook slightly excessive turnover numbers at his age in the midst of such turmoil.